May 2013 – May 2014
President and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping framed the internet as a battlefield for ideological control and appointed himself the head of a top-level internet security committee (see Introduction).
The State Internet Information Office consolidated content restrictions with a harsh crackdown on rumors under newly appointed “Internet Tsar” Lu Wei (see Limits on Content and Violations of User Rights).
A September 2013 judicial interpretation criminalized a range of online content viewed more than 5,000 times or shared by 500 internet users (see Violations of User Rights).
High-profile businessmen were among hundreds detained or interrogated for supposedly abusing their online influence as controls on microblogs tightened (see Violations of User Rights).
Legal activist Xu Zhiyong was jailed for four years for disturbing order and “public spaces on the internet” in April 2014 (see Violations of User Rights).
Telecommunications were shut off in a restive area of Xinjiang; and Uighur academic Ilham Tohti was charged with antistate activity via his website (see Obstacles to Access and Violations of User Rights).
A court in Hainan jailed an internet police officer for accepting bribes to issue takedown notices via instant message to web platforms in his jurisdiction (see Limits on Content).
INTRODUCTION:
On September 21, 2014, the Sina corporation’s Weibo microblog blocked mainland Chinese users from searching for the terms “boycott classes” and “Hong Kong.”[1] The following day, students in the territory launched a week-long strike and occupied city intersections to protest against a Chinese government decision to screen candidates for chief executive in 2017 elections. Democracy activists swelled their numbers, and by early October, tens of thousands of people had taken to the streets.
Observers feared the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would extend internet restrictions implemented on the mainland to Hong Kong in order to suppress the demonstrations. Rumors that police would shut down telecommunications networks spread on September 28. Protesters responded by downloading applications like FireChat, a tool from a San Francisco-based developer which establishes a mesh network between smartphones, allowing them to communicate within a given range without a cellular or internet signal.
In fact, this act alone illustrates the access, information, and digital rights enjoyed by Hong Kong residents under the “one party, two systems” framework in place since the city reverted from British to Chinese rule in 1997.[2] The download page for FireChat is blocked in China, along with dozens of apps that could facilitate political assembly.
Hong Kong’s internet shutdown never took place.[3] Mainland authorities shut off access via state-owned enterprises which dominate the mainland telecommunications market. But service providers in Hong Kong operate in a competitive environment that sustains an international financial sector, as well as the political and corporate groups who support Beijing. Internet in Hong Kong is faster than anywhere in the world except Japan and South Korea,[4] and the chief executive must issue a warrant under a state of emergency to disconnect it.[5]
Hong Kong protesters launched Facebook pages to facilitate communication with both police and supporters overseas,[6] and shared visuals of the umbrellas protestors used to shield themselves from tear gas and pepper spray.[7] In mainland China, Facebook is blocked and censors shut off access to its photo-sharing platform Instagram on September 19 to stop the iconic images from spreading. In Hong Kong, the South China Morning Post documented unfolding events in real time on its website.[8] In mainland China, the outlet was added to the list of international media websites that are blocked or filtered on October 5.[9]
Hong Kong’s robust internet freedom was eroded during the demonstrations. Sina cancelled the Weibo accounts of some Hong Kong protesters, as did Tencent for its messaging service Weixin.[10] Supporters of Occupy Central who downloaded an app supposedly connected with the movement found it had installed malware on their devices. Security experts pointed out that even FireChat and similar resources could potentially expose a user’s identity or location. Police detained several people, including a 13 year old, for allegedly conducting cyberattacks on government websites.[11]
But the impact was much more significant in China, which Freedom on the Net ranked third worst in the world for internet freedom during the coverage period of this report, May 2013 through May 2014. Observers said censorship was more intense in October 2014 than it had been in June, during the 25th anniversary of the military crackdown on 1989 protests in Beijing. An estimated twenty activists were detained for expressing support for the movement online.[12] Information authorities distorted popular discourse online by amplifying state media commentary and nationalist voices. These portrayed the rally as anything but a popular prodemocracy movement, including a foreign plot, and in at least one case, a demonstration of support for Beijing.
Similar tactics were used throughout the past year as China’s internet freedom deteriorated. In May 2013, the State Internet Information Office (SIIO) launched an unusually broad crackdown on rumors under newly-appointed CCP hardliner Lu Wei.[13] In an internal speech at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference on August 19, first publicized by military and party commentators, and later revealed in full by China Digital Times,[14] President and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping described online information control using stronger rhetoric than Hu Jintao’s “guidance” and “channeling.” “The Internet has become the main battlefield for public opinion struggle,” he said in the speech, which provided the ideological underpinning for the internet freedom decline.[15] A month later, Lu Wei articulated his approach in concrete terms, proposing more licensing for online platforms, more real name registration, more information management training for government and private sector agents, and tighter controls on undesirable content.[16]
The emphasis on continuity disguised an important shift. The party’s Central Propaganda Department is traditionally considered the bastion of censorship, but the SIIO, established in 2011, is an organ of the state.[17] Lu Wei appears increasingly central to Xi Jinping’s internet strategy, and was appointed in February 2014 to a panel on information technology and security policy which the president himself heads, a role usually played by the premier.[18] This high-level committee positions internet development, governance, and cybersecurity as fundamental issues for Xi’s administration, along with national security and economic reform.[19]
Xi’s renewed focus on cyberspace comes as China lobbies to change internet governance on a global scale. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a non-profit organization responsible for internet protocol (IP) addresses and URLs, operating with input from nongovernmental stakeholders. In recent years, China has pushed to disempower these nongovernmental groups by transferring ICANN’s regulatory powers to a governmental body, the United Nations International Telecommunication Union.[20] The Chinese political system found new ways to suppress internet freedom domestically in 2014, even while technical, commercial, and legal constituents helped sustain it in Hong Kong. More authoritarian influence over digital resource allocation could tip that balance irrevocably in favor of the state.
