原作：章家敦（美国律师）
翻译：陈律伶（陈文成博士纪念基金会志工）
中国正在崛起或正在沉沦？
今日，我将要挑战人们讨论中国最根本的假设：也就是每个人都在说中国正在崛起，且这是一个“中国世纪”。
要检视这个假设是否正确，从一些历史性的观点角度将有助于厘清此议题。所以，我将要提供您们这过去四十年间的一小则世界历史故事，且我也将从我人生经验的角度来检视。
我毕业于一九七三年。这是一个关键的一年，因为这是一个阿拉伯石油禁运与全球原油市场动荡的年代。当我离开学校，我就知道我往后的日子将要为阿拉伯人工作。
之后，时间很快地到了一九八零年代晚期。我正在香港从事法律工作。我的公司替东京银行处理了很多业务，我的许多伙伴搭上这波日本热。随后，彷佛日本即将接管这个世界的局势正在成形。
而且，有许多证据显示这确实在发生。不到二百五十英亩的日本皇室皇宫，其价值超过整个加州境内的资产；一九九零年的日本土地价值估计约超过地球其它地方的一半；在东京上市的股票价值超过在纽约、法兰克福、伦敦、巴黎与多伦多等地股票市场的总和；全球前十大银行与前四大证券公司皆为日本人所有。
当时的日本人恣意妄为，例如：从南极洲输入冰块，到处购买名牌。这就是为什么人们讨论“日本人的世纪”的由来。
我对地缘政治并不感兴趣，但我知道日本将会殒落。我如何会有如此被视为世上最聪明之人才会拥有的洞察力呢？很简单，我了解我当时已非为阿拉伯人工作。我已经看见在此之前的诸多歇斯底里景象，只是此时换了不同的演员阵容而已。而且我了解到一件事，但这件事人们现在可能忘了：也就是所有的泡沫皆会破灭。
但是现在这个世界又重复上演一次。人们相信“人口即是命运”的论述而下了结论，认为中国拥有超过美国五倍多的人口，因此亦将会有超过五倍大的经济规模。
我不同意这样的论述。我认为我们必须用更广的视野来看待这件事。
尽管我们看到中国表面上的经济改革，其下的政治体制却少有显著的改变。毛泽东建立了一个非正常的社会，但他至少十足现实主义地用高而坚硬的围墙包围住他所新创建的共和国，所以这个国家可以在其内部无限期的生存下去。他的继位者则寻找创立一个更现代化的国家，但他们尚未改变共产党所支配及人们所跟随信仰的毛泽东主义路线，尽管在此同时，中国的新任领导人们正成功地进行国家的开放。当他们这样做时，所有来自全世界的政治、经济与社会的力量也都正在影响着中国。在这过程中的某个时刻，这个中央集权体制将会垮台。这就好像毛泽东试着要在他的新共和国里藉由颁布命令废除万有引力定律，然而，当这个国家为后继者们所开放时，这个引力已经正在中国起作用了。
但是现今，这个改变的过程已经得到属于它自己的推动动力，共产党已无法阻止它。当这个推动动力持续时，中华人民共和国正在开始看见，乃至于感觉这个现代世界。简言之，中国正在变得不那么中国。
所以今日的议题不再是这个中央政府正在做对的事或错的事，而是时间问题。在短期内，往后的五年间，中国将会面临许多挑战，有些挑战将是前所未有的。接下来我们就要来讨论其中的六项挑战。
首先，只有少数好的经济产出效果是处于轨道射程上的。因为对于中国崛起的假设中皆预设中国为一个世界最好的经济体，所以我们需要花时间去检视它是否是如此。
我们先从最近的出口来看， 也就是最重要的中国经济三脚櫈模式。
去年，中国的出口下降了百分之十六。而中期未来的前景，充其量而言，将是不明确的。中国的出口在十二月至九月间暴增，但随后开始下降，且因全球需求疲弱，故在今年将不太可能持续而超越先前的表现。
需求的疲弱不只发生在已开发经济的国家，新兴国家亦然。再者，如果我们进入看似很可能发生的二次探底衰退，需求将会遭受特别沉重的打击。
在大环境景气佳时，出口经济是上天所赐与的礼物。然而，在景气不佳时，这将是一个诅咒。当处于大萧条时，则是经常帐盈余国家必须使自己去适应恶化的经济情况的最艰难时刻，最后也受创最重。同理可证，在看似持续性成长时期所传递出一片荣景的中国经济模式，在现今局势下格外不合适。
面对这些情况的种种挑战，北京当局于二零零八年七月，采取保护主义路线。这已经导致其贸易伙伴思考采取报复手段。中国相较其它国家更为依赖国际贸易，故一个全球贸易战争对于中国的伤害将甚于其它国家。
一个全球贸易战争将可能来临。我们必须记住中国的出口是在后冷战时期蓬勃发展的。在这个不寻常的良性周期中，诸多国家想要将中国纳入世界体系内，并且宽厚、容忍其重商主义政策。
但我们已经离开那段持续发展的时期。今日，每个国家都想要增加出口。欧巴玛（Barack Obama）总统在他今年的国情咨文宣示，将要使美国出口依其国家出口计划在未来五年达到成长一倍的目标。简言之，欧巴马要使美国像中国一样，所以我们将不再让中国作为中国。
在保护主义或计划贸易时代──不论你想如何定义它──中国将无法透过这样的方式创造荣景，就如同其在十年前的亚洲金融风暴中亦是如此。
总体而言，分析师不担心即将到来的出口衰退。他们认为中央政府可以刺激内需来提振国内经济。
北京当局宣称要增加消费。但我们必须看见事实，事实就是在经济中消费所扮演的角色正在下滑中，也就是从历史平均百分之六十下降至今日约百分之三十。没有一个国家有如此低的比率。而中央政府的措施即为刺激出口，例如抑制人民币的升值，而这也不可避免地无法鼓励消费。再者，政府的刺激方案着重被视为反消费的基础建设开发与工业生产。
在这样的环境下，中国消费者事实上十分小心谨慎。真相是北京当局透过发布统计数据来显示每月零售销售额持续增加中。以八月为例，零售销售额增加幅度为百分之十八点四。但我们必须记住北京当局的数字数据是包含政府采购，中央政府统计学家也将工厂生产数量也计入，换句话说，这是将未售出的库存量也视为零售销售额。此外，从我们可以辨识的资料来看，中国的技术官僚已经正在只是地方政府与国营企业购买汽车，许多购入但未被使用的汽车被停放在停车场里，这样的景象发生在全中国境内。这也是唯一可以解释为什么中国汽车去年销售量增加百分之二十四，然而汽油销售量却只上升约百分之五的原因了。中国人称这些交通工具摆着不用为「车轮腐败」。
另外，还有一个问题是有关零售销售额数字并没有与其它资料一致，尤其是去年我们所见的持续性通货紧缩、强劲的零售销售与快速的货币扩张三者在同一时间并存。这样情况在另一个星球也许可能发生，但绝不可能存在于地球。
最重要的事实是，不能再视消费为解决之道，除非直到北京确实而非口头上扬弃其投资导向的经济策略。
接下来让我们回到中国经济的三脚櫈模式──投资部分。
北京当局的五千八百六十亿美金刺激方案正在创造经济成长。以今年前半年为例，呈现惊人的百分之十一点一的经济成长。因此，中国在此刻成为世界第二大经济体，并超越日本该年的第二季。
在中国刺激方案实施第一年，这一整年不是直接就是间接地透过国营银行挹注大量资金。根据我的计算，一点一兆美金投入中国四点七六兆美金的经济中。
然而，伴随着这样有如吃糖后的兴奋感，出现许多问题，首先则是所有的支出出现非常低效率情形。
但是，这并不是刺激方案最严重的过失。最严重的罪过是北京当局的方案导致一个更大的国家经济与更小的私有经济：约百分之九十五近来的成长可归因于投资，几乎所有的投资来自国家。且，可想而知，国家投资资金是投入国营部门里。国家刺激计划偏爱大型国营企业胜于中小型私人企业，并且国家金融机构正挪用信贷给国家赞助的基础建设。
从过去三十年里，受惠私人企业的发展，中国经济已维持以每年平均百分之九点九的经济成长率扩张。但是，北京当局正利用国家资金走向再国有化经济模式。如他们所言，“现在的共产党亦是经济体”。再国有化将会对中国经济成长带来负面影响，而这个时间点若非即将到来也至少在未来几年内发生。
刺激方案的资金已经导致错乱与失衡现象，例如未来将难以解套的资产市场泡沫化问题。
有关中国经济最后一个论点，有些人论证提出这些问题将很快地被遗忘，因为经济正在超级景气循环中持续向上。此话没错，中国是一个超级循环，但那个中国已经结束了。
为什么呢？最重要的原因是中国已经背离它证实有效的成功之道。当中国国家主席胡锦涛拥抱锁国的新经济典范，就已经舍弃邓小平的改革开放政策。这些日子，北京当局正在建立所谓的“国有经济布局”与限制外国企业机会的政策。
那经济改革呢？没有什么值得讨论的，充其量只能说他们只是在做修补动作而已。
因为北京当局仍然紧握对经济的掌控，中央技术官僚可以透过一百种不同的技术管理成果。然而，他们不能避免必然会发生之事。由于延迟必定会发生的调整，他们正在使最后的清算更糟。政府主导式经济总是会运作下去，直到他们无法继续为止。而到了此时，他们也将快速分崩离析。
我前面所提及中国将面临六个问题。第二个则是当其它国家坚决要求中国北京当局停止违反世界贸易组织的义务以及这些国家不再愿意接受来自中国所生产的瑕疵品与有毒食品时，中国所面临的贸易难题。
第三，中国国内银行体系正处于困境中。中国官方的逾期放款比率──截至今年上半年，共计百分之一点三──这是一个幻象。他们已经重新对有问题贷款进行展期。
有非常多可疑问的贷款有待进行展期或再议条件。如我们所知的五千八百六十亿美金的刺激方案，其导致放款激增有如选美竞赛，无助于改善经济生存力。
中国银行团于去年放款百分之九十五点三，超过二零零八年。今年，尽管有抑制的政策，放款仍然仅较二零零九年少一些。每一次在这个规模的贷款激增时，银行危机随之而来。
历史也会证明金流最终将会反转。当它们果真如此时──注意在今年年底或明年初某一刻的发生──我们将可见到足以在历史上记上一笔的危机。
第四，国家社会安全体系仍不足，且在某种程度上比银行更不佳。北京当局将需要拿出一点二兆美金，在未来提供几千亿美金作为救济金之用。这是真实所发生的，即使北京当局在过去五年内已着手在筹集这个属于国家义务的资金。
再者，中国面临难以募集资金以支撑快速老化社会的人口问题。人们时常在谈论粗暴的一胎化政策所带来的社会灾难，例如：娼妓、人口贩卖（尤指严重女人）、艾滋病等问题，但他们也时常忘记这个政策亦伴随严重经济的影响。
中国劳动人口约在二零一三年将停滞成长，国力约在二零二五年将开始萎缩，也许甚至提前至二零三零年。一个萎缩的人口也将很可能意味着萎缩的国民生产总值与缺乏支持福利的资金。
这个国家受惠于它本身的“人口红利”，即国家劳动人口暂时的激增。不久后，当家户中一位工作人力要负担两位父母及四位祖父母时，“人口税”将随之而来。人口也许不一定是运气，却将为中国带来巨大的阻碍。
第五，这个国家正处于重大环境危机的悬崖边，也许是世界史上最坏的情况，或至少是自《圣经》时代的洪流起，最坏的景况。世界上二十个最干旱的城市中，其中有十六座城市在中国境内。
中国最迫切的环境问题为水资源问题，水资源在中国不是太多即是太少。今年，国家在这十年间遭受最严重的洪灾，时间也许更长。今年旱灾后，水灾随之而来，这是自明朝以来最严重的灾害。旱灾发生在中国北方，年复一年，日复一日，如此恶劣的环境使得许多人民考虑应迁都至水源较充沛的地区。
中国第二长河——黄河，其部份流域自一九七零年代初期已经干涸，且在一九九零年代即每年持续干枯。从那时开始，政府已经开始自水库泄水方式来处理这个问题。但这仅只是掩饰真实情况而已，黄河的流出量约是一九四零年代水量的百分之十。
而中国最长的河──长江，现在也枯竭中。
河流干涸且北方沙漠范围逐渐扩大。今日，沙漠化地区已经占全中国超过百分之二十七的国土。当沙漠逐渐南移，朝向国家的东部与西部扩展，并以每年数百平方英里的数字增加。当中国耗尽更多珍贵的土地时，这个过程已经看到中国沙漠的出现。
在几年前，科学技术部门已警告水资源危机愈加威胁中国未来的生存，且将更加恶化。中央政府如果没有解决对策，将把国家带向生态灾难的困境。
中国领导人表示他们正在尝试保存水资源及清理环境，但他们并没有真正认真看待这件事。对他们而言，经济发展远比任何事情重要。而现今，经济需要政府投资以带动成长，环境议题对各级政府来说并非优先项目。为推动刺激方案，北京当局正忽视来自西方国家近年共同呼吁的环境限制议题。
第六，中华人民共和国在中国历史上从未如此贪污腐败。不幸地，贪污是共产党无法解决的问题。自一九五一年开始，也就是中华人民共和国建国两年后，就有反腐败联盟组织的出现，但中国随着时间只有变得更糟。
根据分析指出，当这五千八百六十亿美金新刺激方案的经费投入政府计划却没有完整的控管计划，将可能是触发中国历史上最大的贪腐浪潮。在政府中最重要之金融机构的一位资深经济学家提出，他个人可以用文件证实两千九百四十亿美金来自北京当局的经费已经进入私人口袋，换句话说，这笔钱被窃取了。
我们知道有许多钱，说委婉些，是被误用或使用不当。我们如何得知呢？以澳门赌场为例，这里在宣布刺激方案前的经济是疲弱不振的，但现今却迅速大量获利。为什么呢？官员们拿这些政府刺激的资金去赌博，这些资金从政府计划里移转至他们的口袋中。已故的共产党政治家陈云曾经有精辟的评论，他提到“不反腐败要亡国，反腐败要亡党”。
所以，中国现今有许多问题。如我前所列举的这些问题，对于共产党而言将难以解决。将这些问题总和来看，我们可以看到为什么这个政权将会崩溃。当学者们低估看待这其中某一议题或其它议题时，他们对于中国的崩溃瓦解议题是认为不值得一提的。而问题是中国要面对的这些挑战是同时间一起出现，而非单一问题出现在个别时间里。
然而，这并非特定问题的单一课题。尽管中国可以在短期解决这些问题，共产党将仍然要面对一个难以克服的挑战。那些对于乐观看待中华人民共和国未来的人指出，在过去三十年头里的中国经济一直是成长与进步的。我同意中国经济成长了好长一段时间，而这正是为何我认为这一党专政的国家正处于危险境地。
一般来说，改变对重整中的政权是艰苦的。没有比现代化更能动摇国家制度的东西了，而这可以激化甚至有利于此改变过程，特别是针对这些政权。
那些想要知道中国未来也许想要重新擦亮托克维尔（Tocqueville）的招牌，托克维尔曾提出，在法国革命前的农民厌恶封建主义更甚于欧洲其它处境更恶劣地区的农民。最不满的地区是法国一直以来最首善之区。再者，法国大革命是在前所未有的经济快速起飞之后。故，诚如托克维尔所言，“稳定增加的繁荣”（steadily increasing prosperity）不会使民众安定。相反地，它将引起“骚动的情绪”（a spirit of unrest）。
中国领导人不应该认为托克维尔正在撰写属于另一个大陆，另一个世纪的十八世纪的法国之事实，而引以为安慰。我们看到这些相似的趋势在二十世纪晚期的泰国已经结束，更重要的是，仅仅二十年前的南韩儒家社会与战后中国移民所统治的台湾社会两者稍晚亦然。
资深北京官员现今面对所有改革中威权独裁主义的困境：经济成功危及他们的掌控权力。持续性的现代化是一党专政的敌人。革命在许多情况下发生，但是当政治机制无法跟上来自经济改变所带来社会力量的释放，革命特别容易发生。没有比僵化的领导人更容易激怒正在崛起的社会阶级。
北京当局的政策看似导致了人民与政府间的隔阂的扩大，因此，对于北京政府，在可预见的未来会有极大不稳定性存在。在今日，一股无法想象的社会改变力量以前所未闻的速度存在于大部分的政府赞助的经济成长与社会工程中。但同时，共产党依旧站在有意义政治改革的对立面。
所以，当中国在近年发展愈益繁荣时，对于这样的隔阂也就不应该感到意外了，且中国社会也变得更为不稳定。根据一项报告统计，去年共计有二十三万次社会抗争事件。这也是自二零零八年十二万七千次以及在十年间的初期，每年约有八万至九万次，此后每年数量逐渐增加。
从今年五月于广东的日本本田汽车工厂罢工事件来看，罢工潮蔓延至长江三角洲，更往北至天津。之后，更是如瀑布般倾泄而下，席卷整个中国。这个席卷全国的速度正好显示中国社会的波动性。
且这是中国人正开始找到他们勇气的象征。当这样的情况发生时，社会就会改变。当普罗大众发觉到他们人多势众之时，威权体制的政府便会感到焦虑与恐惧。“中国人当他们失望沮丧时，他们不会抗争；但是当他们认为他们可以透过抗争逃脱困境时，他们就会发动抗争”，《纽约时报》（New York Times）专栏作家尼可拉斯‧克里斯多福（Nicholas Kristof）指出。假如北京当局想要从苏联政权垮台的经验学习些什么的话，当恐惧消失时，这个政权就将难以维系。
就在北京奥运之前，我当然正与一位杰出企业家谈论事情，地点位于他上海摩天大楼里偌大的办公室里。在席间，他认为中国在这二十年间有多大的改变，他并且笑容满面地说道：“没有人会再害怕政府”。
中国执政当局虽然试着以更高压方式统治，但它正在丧失它威吓的能力。这样的结果让中国人民变得更自觉、更自信与更敢挑战政府。
在六月，一位在湖南省（毛泽东故乡）政府任职的安全人员，偷了一把自动武器后枪杀了三名法官并伤及其它三名民众。由于他攻击司法人员，自此变成网络上的英雄。当许多社会认定的英雄居然是杀害政府官员的凶手，就可以看出这个国家本质上已经有许多矛盾存在。
很显然地，这个国家的统治组织已经丧失其正当性，甚至在相对富裕阶级亦然。
中国中产阶级──这十多年改革下的受惠者，正在走向街头。每当他们的权利受到威胁时，他们挺身站出来，就如同农民或劳工一样。假如在今日所发生的诸多抗议动荡事件，这些事件的共同点即是诉求正义与要求公平对待。这对一般社会大众来说是一个有希望性的信号，但对于共产党而言则否。
共产党至今仍大权在握，以防止其竞争者合流，进而组成全国性的组织。然而，自从二十多年前天安门大屠杀后，今日的中国人民第一次可以网络上与其它论坛有国际对话的机会。结果，满腹委屈与牢骚的民众开始一起行动，提出对于政权的挑战。
毛泽东藉由分化中国人民成为小单位并使其孤立，以巩固他个人的权力。在当今现代化的社会，他们正在倒退中。这也许成为这三十年改革下的重要遗产，也是毛泽东最害怕之事。
毛泽东也害怕中国人民寻求自治。许多人认为中国人还没准备好实行民主制度。但，这是错误的想法。刘晓波获得诺贝尔和平奖——这个对于中国人是令人激奋的响应，即是对于中国已经准备好真正的选举、言论与法律自由最明确的肯定。
我如何知道呢？我在北京奥运前回去我父亲的故乡——如皋市，当时没有人想要谈论这个被戏称为“政府的比赛”的奥运。相反地，几乎每个人问起我的太太、美国政治体制如何运作以及下一届美国总统选举谁将获胜。他们想要知道任何有关麦肯（John McCain）与欧巴马的事情。
简言之，中国人民想要一番新气象。且，无论如何，中国人民终将胜利。
中国有一天终将自由，且这个时刻即将到来。
本文为台湾发展与文化交流协会二零一零年十一月十一日至十三日假台北市天母会议中心主办《中国民主化展望与探索》国际会议专文
Is China Rising or Falling?
Gordon G. Chang
Is China rising or is it falling?
Today, I am going to challenge the most fundamental assumption people make
about China. Just about everyone says China is rising and that this is “China’s century.”
To see if this assumption is correct, it would help to have a little historical perspective. So I’m going to give you a short history of the world during the last four decades, and I’m going to do all this through the lens of my life.
I graduated college in 1973. The year is significant because that was the time of the Arab oil embargo and the turmoil in global petroleum markets. When I got out of school, I just knew I was going to be working for some sheik for the rest of my life.
Then we fast forward to the end of the 1980s. I was practicing law in Hong Kong. My firm did a lot of work for Tokyo banks, and almost all of my partners were caught up in the Japan craze. Then, it seemed as if the Japanese were going to take over the world.
And there was plenty of evidence suggesting that was going to happen. The Emperor’s Imperial Palace, not even 250 acres, was valued at more than all the real estate in California; land in Japan in 1990 was worth fifty percent more than the remainder of the planet; the value of stocks listed in Tokyo exceeded the combined value of those listed in New York, Frankfurt, London, Paris, and Toronto; and all of the world’s ten largest banks were Japanese as were its four largest securities companies.
The Japanese people went wild, importing ice cubes from Antarctica and buying everyone’s else’s icons.
That’s why everyone talked about “the Japanese century.”
I wasn’t interested in geopolitics then, but I knew that Japan would falter. How did I gain this remarkable insight that had somehow eluded the world’s smartest people? Simple, I realized I was not then working for Arabs. I had seen all this hysteria before, just with a different cast of characters.
And I knew something then that people are forgetting now: that all bubbles burst.
But now the world is at it again. People leap from the statement that “demography is destiny” to the conclusion that a China five times more populous than the United States will have an economy five times larger.
I disagree. I say we need to look at the broad sweep of events.
Despite all the economic reform in China that we see on the surface, the political system has changed remarkably little underneath. Mao Zedong created an abnormal society. But he was at least enough of a realist to surround his new republic with high and strong walls so that it could survive almost indefinitely on the inside. His successors have sought to create a more modern nation. But they have not changed the Maoist system, where the Communist Party dictates and the people are supposed to follow. Yet at the same time China’s new leaders are successively opening the country. As they do so, all the forces that apply around the world—political, economic, and social—are beginning to apply in China as well. At some point in this process this centrally directed system will fail. It’s as if Mao tried to abolish the law of gravity by decree in his new republic. As the country is opened up by his successors, gravity is applying in China.
By now, this process of change has acquired its own momentum—the Communist Party can no longer stop it. And as it continues, the People’s Republic is beginning to take on the look, and even some of the feel, of the modern world. In short, China is becoming less Chinese.
So the issue today is not whether the central government is doing the right things or the wrong things. The issue is time. In a short period of time, the next few years, China will face many challenges, some of them unprecedented. Let’s discuss six of them.
First, the economy is on a trajectory with few good outcomes. Because predictions of China’s rise are predicated on its world-beating economy, we need to spend time to see what is actually going on.
We’ll start with exports, until recently, the most important of the three legs of the Chinese economy.
Last year, China’s exports dropped 16.0 percent. And the prospect for the intermediate future is, at best, uncertain. Chinese exports skyrocketed in the December-to-September period, but that was off a low base and the momentum is unlikely to last beyond this year due to fragile global demand.
Demand is fragile not only in developed economies but also in emerging ones. Moreover, demand could take an especially hard hit if we enter the second part of a double-dip downturn, which is looking increasingly likely.
In good times, an export economy is a blessing. In bad ones, however, it is a curse. As we saw in the Great Depression, it was the current account-surplus countries that had the hardest time adjusting to deteriorating economic conditions and, consequently, suffered the most. That will prove to be the case now as well. China’s economic model, which delivered prosperity in a period of seemingly unending growth, is particularly ill-suited to current conditions.
To meet the challenges of these conditions, Beijing, in July of 2008, adopted protectionist measures. That is already causing its trade partners to think of retaliation. China is more dependent on international commerce than almost any other nation, so a global trade war will hurt the Chinese more than others.
And a global trade war could be coming. We have to remember that China’s exports boomed in the post-Cold War era. In this unusually benign period, countries wanted to integrate China into the international system and were indulgent, tolerating its mercantilist policies.
But we have left that time of uninterrupted growth. Now, every nation wants to export more. President Obama, in his State of the Union message this year, announced a goal of doubling American exports in the next five years with his National Export Initiative. In short, Obama wants America to become just like China. So we will not let China be China anymore.
In an era of protectionism or of managed trade—whatever you wish to label it—
China will not be able to export its way to prosperity, as it did in the Asian Financial Crisis at the end of the last decade.
Analysts, by and large, don’t worry about the coming falloff in exports. They say the central government can stimulate domestic consumption to take up the slack.
Beijing says it wants to increase consumption. But we need to look at the facts. In fact, consumption’s role in the economy has been sliding, dropping from its historical average of about 60 percent to about 30 percent today. No country has a lower rate. And the steps the central government is taking to stimulate exports—like holding down the value of its currency—inevitably discourage consumption. Moreover, the government’s stimulus program, which focuses on building infrastructure and industrial production, is by definition anti-consumption.
In this environment, China’s consumers have in fact been cautious. It’s true that Beijing keeps issuing statistics showing retail sales increasing each and every month. In August, for example, they jumped 18.4 percent. But we must remember Beijing includes government procurement in retail sales numbers; central government statisticians have been counting factory production—in other words, unsold inventory—as retail sales; and from what we can tell, Chinese technocrats have been ordering localities and state enterprises to buy cars, and many of them are parked in lots across China, unused. That’s about the only credible explanation as to how the number of registered cars could increase 24 percent last year while gas sales went up only about 5 percent. The Chinese even have a name for the stored vehicles: “lot rot.”
And there is another problem in that the retail sales numbers have not been consistent with other data, especially last year when we saw persistent deflation, robust retail sales, and rapid monetary expansion all at the same time. That combination may be possible in another galaxy but not ours.
The overriding reality is that consumption cannot become significant until Beijing, in fact and not just in words, abandons its investment-led strategy.
And that gets us to the third leg of the Chinese economy, investment.
Beijing’s $586 billion stimulus plan is creating growth. In the first half of this year, for instance, the economy grew by an impressive 11.1 percent. As a result, the Chinese economy is now the second largest in the world, surpassing Japan’s in the second quarter of this year.
In its first full year of existence, Beijing’s stimulus program has, either directly or indirectly through the state banks, pumped, according to my calculations, $1.1 trillion into China’s $4.76 trillion economy.
There are a number of problems, however, with this “sugar high.” For one thing, all the spending is grossly inefficient.
Yet that is not its worst sin. The worst sin is that Beijing’s program is resulting in a bigger state economy and a smaller private one: about 95 percent of recent growth is attributable to investment, almost all of it from the state. And state investment is going into the state sector, of course. The state’s stimulus plan is favoring large state enterprises over small and medium-sized private firms, and state financial institutions are diverting credit to state-sponsored infrastructure.
Over the last 30 years, China’s economy has expanded at an average annual rate of 9.9 percent because of the private sector, but now Beijing is renationalizing the economy with state cash. As they say, “the Party is now the economy.” Renationalization will have negative consequences for Chinese growth, if not soon then at least over the next few years.
And the flood of stimulus money has created dislocations and imbalances, such as the property market bubble, that will be difficult to unwind.
One final point about the Chinese economy. Some argue that the troubles will soon be forgotten because the economy is in a supercycle upward. Yes, China was in a supercycle, but that has ended.
Why? By far the most important reason is that China has turned it back on its proven formula for success. President Hu Jintao has abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “reform and opening up” as he embraces a new economic paradigm of closing the country down. Beijing, these days, is building up its so-called “national champions” and
restricting opportunities for foreign business.
And economic reform? There’s not much of it. The best you can say is that they are tinkering.
Because Beijing still retains significant control over the economy, central technocrats can, through a hundred different techniques, manage outcomes. Yet they cannot avoid the inevitable. And by postponing the adjustments that must occur, they are making the final reckoning worse. State-led economies always work—until they do not. When they do not, they fall apart fast.
I mentioned there were six problems. The second one is China faces trade difficulties as other nations insist that Beijing stop violating its World Trade Organization obligations and as they are increasingly unwilling to accept defective products and poisonous foods.
Third, the domestic banking system is in trouble. China’s official nonperforming loan ratio—1.3 percent at the end of the first half of this year—is a fantasy. They have gone back to rolling over questionable loans.
And there are a lot of questionable loans to rollover. The $586 billion stimulus plan, as we all know, resulted in an explosion of lending to “beauty-show projects” that had little economic viability.
Last year, Chinese banks lent 95.3 percent more than they did in 2008. This year, despite a clampdown, lending is running only a little behind last year’s torrid pace. Every time there has been a lending surge of this dimension, a banking crisis has followed.
As history also demonstrates, eventually financial flows reverse. When they do so—and look for this to happen sometime at the end of this year or the beginning of the next one—we could see a crisis of historic proportions.
Fourth, the nation’s social security system is inadequate, in some ways even in worse shape than the banks. Beijing will need to come up with $1.2 trillion, give or take a few hundred billion dollars, in the years ahead to provide benefits. This is true even though Beijing has made progress in funding its obligations in the last half decade.
Moreover, China faces a demographic problem that will make it difficult to raise funds to support a rapidly aging society. People often talk about the disastrous social consequences of the brutally enforced one-child policy—prostitution, trafficking in women, HIV, for instance—but they often forget it has serious economic effects as well.
China’s workforce will level off in about 2013, and the country will begin to shrink around 2025, maybe even 2020. A shrinking population will, in all probability, mean shrinking GDP and less money for benefits.
The country has already benefited from its “demographic dividend,” an extraordinary bulge in the country’s workforce. Soon there will be a heavy “demographic tax” when one worker supports two parents and four grandparents. Demography may not be destiny, but it will create high barriers for China.
Fifth, the country stands on the edge of a monumental environmental crisis, perhaps the worst in world history, or at least the worst since the flood in Biblical times. Sixteen of the world’s twenty dirtiest cities are located in the People’s Republic.
China’s most pressing environmental problem involves water, either too much or too little of it. This year, the country suffered from the worst flooding in a decade, perhaps longer. The flooding follows this year’s drought, the worst one since the Ming dynasty. The drought in the northern part of the country is, from year to year, so bad that some people think the government should move the capital to an area with more water.
Parts of the Yellow River, China’s second longest, have dried up since the early 1970s. It ran dry every year in the 1990s but one. Since then, the government has remedied the problem by releasing water from reservoirs, but that has only masked conditions. The outflow of the river is about 10 percent of what it was in the 1940s.
The Yangtze, China’s longest, also dries up these days.
Rivers are dry, and deserts advance from the north. Today, they cover more than 27 percent of the country’s land. The figure increases by a couple hundred square miles each year as the sands move south, both in the eastern and western portions of the country. This relentless process has seen China’s deserts merge as they swallow up more precious land.
A few summers ago the science and technology ministry warned, “The water resources crisis even threatens the future survival of the Chinese nation.” If anything, things have gotten worse since then. Central government policies are leading the Chinese state to an ecological disaster for which there is no remedy.
Chinese leaders say they’re trying to conserve water and clean up the environment,
but they’re not really serious. For most of them, economic development is far more important than anything else. And now that the economy needs state investment to grow, the environment is becoming even less of a priority for government at all levels. To get stimulus projects going, Beijing is ignoring the environmental restrictions put in place in recent years with so much fanfare from the West.
Sixth, China has never been more corrupt in its history. Unfortunately, corruption is one problem the Communist Party cannot solve. There have been anti-corruption campaigns since 1951, just two years after the founding of the People’s Republic, but China has only become more diseased over time.
The new $586 billion stimulus campaign, according to analysts, may be triggering the biggest surge of corruption in Chinese history as governments throw money at state projects with few controls. A senior economist at one of the state’s most prominent financial institutions says he can personally document that $294 billion of Beijing’s money “went private”—in other words, was stolen.
We know a lot of cash has been misdirected, to use a polite term. How do we know that? Macau casinos, which had been languishing before the announcement of the stimulus program, now are turning profits hand over fist. Why? Officials are gambling with state stimulus funds that they have diverted from government projects to their own pockets.
The late Party statesman Chen Yun once astutely remarked, “Not fighting corruption would destroy the country; fighting it would destroy the Party.”
So China has problems. Any one of them—and I have not listed them all—would be difficult for the Communist Party to take. Add them all together, and we can see why the regime will fail. Scholars dismiss talk of China’s collapse as they downplay one concern or another. The point is that China faces these challenges all at once, not one challenge at a time.
Yet this is not just a question of specific problems. Even if it could solve each and every one of them in short order, the Communist Party would still face one insurmountable challenge. Those who are optimistic about the future of the People’s Republic point to all the economic growth and progress of the last three decades. I agree that China has come a long way—and that is precisely why I think the country’s one-party state is in such jeopardy.
Change, in general, is tough for reforming regimes. There is nothing so destabilizing as modernization, which can radicalize even the beneficiaries of progress—and especially them.
Those wanting to know the future of China may want to brush up on Tocqueville, who noted that peasants in pre-revolutionary France detested feudalism more than their counterparts in other portions of Europe, where conditions were worse. Discontent was highest in those parts of France where there had been the most improvement. Moreover, the French Revolution followed an economic advance as rapid as it was unprecedented. So, as Tocqueville notes, “steadily increasing prosperity” doesn’t tranquilize citizens. On the contrary, it promotes “a spirit of unrest.”
Chinese leaders should not take comfort from the fact that Tocqueville was writing about 18th century France, another continent and another century. We saw these same trends play out in late 20th century Thailand and, more important, both in the Confucian society of South Korea a mere two decades ago and the Chinese-dominated society of Taiwan just a little later.
Senior Beijing officials now face the dilemma of all reforming authoritarians: economic success endangers their continued control. Sustained modernization is the enemy of one-party systems. Revolutions occur under many conditions, but especially when political institutions do not keep up with the social forces unleashed by economic change. Nothing irritates a rising social class like inflexible leaders.
Beijing’s policies seem designed to widen this gap between the people and their government, thereby ensuring greater instability for the foreseeable future. Today there’s unimaginable societal change at unheard of speed thanks in large part to government-sponsored economic growth and social engineering. Yet at the same time the Communist Party stands in the way of meaningful political change.
So it should come as no surprise that as China grew more prosperous in recent years, it also became less stable. Last year, there were 230,000 protests according to one report. That’s way up from 127,000 in 2008 and the 80,000 to 90,000 a year during the earlier part of this decade.
Strikes, which began at a Honda plant in Guangdong province in May, spread to the Yangtze delta, and then up to Tianjin. The strikes then cascaded across the nation. The speed at which they raced across the country is just an indication of the volatility of Chinese society.
And it is an indication that the Chinese people are beginning to find their courage. When that happens, societies change. Authoritarian governments tremble when common folk begin to feel the safety of numbers. “Chinese don’t protest when they are most upset, but when they think they can get away with it,” notes New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof. If Beijing wants to learn anything from the Soviet collapse, it is once fear is gone, the system cannot last.
Just before the Beijing Olympics, I was talking with a prominent businessman in his spacious office in a Shanghai skyscraper, and he acknowledged how much China had changed in the last twenty years. “No one fears the government any more,” he noted with a broad smile.
The Chinese government, although it tries to be more coercive, is losing its ability to intimidate. As a consequence, the Chinese people have become self-aware, assertive, and defiant.
In June, a security officer at a government office in Hunan province, the home of Mao Zedong, stole an automatic weapon and killed three judges while wounding three others. He has since become a hero on the internet for his attack on hated judicial personnel. You know something is fundamentally wrong when many of society’s heroes are killers of government officials.
Clearly, the country’s ruling organization has lost legitimacy, even among the relatively well-to-do.
Middle-class Chinese, the beneficiaries of decades of reform, are taking to the streets. They act like peasants and workers whenever they think their rights are threatened. If there is one unifying theme for unrest today, it is the desire for justice, the demand to be treated fairly. That’s a hopeful sign for society in general but not for the Communist Party.
The Communist Party has remained in power by preventing competitors from banding together to form nationwide organizations. Yet today on the internet and in other forums, the Chinese people are having national conversations for the first time since the Tiananmen massacre two decades ago. As a result, citizens with common grievances are beginning to act in unison, posing a challenge of the first order to the regime.
Mao Zedong consolidated his power by dividing up the Chinese people into small units and isolating them from each other. Now, in a modernizing society, they are putting themselves back together. This is perhaps the most important legacy of thirty years of reform—and what Mao feared most.
Mao also feared the Chinese people trying to govern themselves. Many say the Chinese are not ready for democracy. That’s not true. The electrifying response of the Chinese people to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo is a clear confirmation that China is ready for real elections, a free press, and the rule of law.
How do I know this? I went back to Rugao, my dad’s hometown, just before the Olympics. No one wanted to talk about the event, which was derided as “the government’s games.”
Instead, almost everyone asked my wife and me how the American political system worked and who would win the presidential election. They wanted to know everything we could tell them about John McCain and Barack Obama.
In short, the Chinese people want something new. And one way or another, they will prevail.
China will one day be free. And that day will be soon.
